Sunday, November 18, 2012

Of Miracles | Hume's Apprentice

“Let’s begin by being generous and assuming right out of the gate that there is a fifty percent chance that miracles happen occasionally”

I realise that this is a rhetorical ploy, but why be so generous?

Probability models only make sense when we have some way of determining, analytically, or estimating empirically, statistically, probability values we can use.

Miracles, as you define them being supernatural, require a supernatural entity with supposed powers of universe creation, interest in human affairs, and so on. What do we know about the requirements and possibilities of events relating to the business of universe creation, deities, miracles? Nothing.

If I tell you I have a bag with 100 marbles, well mixed, all identical except that 50 are white and 50 are black, and I asked you to estimate the chance of picking a white ball, you’d say 50%.

If I tell you I have a bag of undisclosed size that contains an undisclosed number of balls, possibly zero, but if there are any balls some may or may not be white, and I then ask you to estimate the chance of picking out a white ball, would you still be generous enough to say 50%? Or would you say: I haven’t the foggiest?

In the God delusion Dawkins was equally rhetorically generous about the chance of there being a God. The problem is that the religious will be quite happy to run with this. But,

Haven’t got the foggiest 100% (note to theists)

Haven’t got the foggiest 50% (note to agnostics)

Haven’t got the foggiest 0% (note to atheists)

Haven’t got the foggiest = I Don’t know, so stop using probabilistic models.

This difficulty also causes a problem with regard to this too:

“(that probability will be raised or lowered based upon our examination of the evidence)”

How exactly?

To pick up and run with abb3w’s point that ‘supernatural experience’ is thus internally inconsistent, if something is ‘super’-natural how would we experience it? We define the natural as that which is, that which we can experience (directly or indirectly), and we already include in the natural that which we may never be able to experience for practical reasons. Any ‘super’-natural entity we experience or any effects such an entity introduces into the natural world become, by definition, natural. Our models of the natural world will be changed to encompass them. So really all we can to is examine these ‘miracles’ as unusual natural events and try to explain them. Faith healing, response to prayer, Jesus on toast, etc., tend to be explained naturally or remain unexplained. Remaining unexplained means they still remain classified under “Haven’t the foggiest”, and so cannot be claimed to be what theists think of as miracles.

The basic and simple God hypothesis, that the creation of universes requires some entity that has something similar to what we consider to be agency, is a reasonable speculative hypothesis. But the speculation has to stop there, because no further productive speculation, about His interest in humans, omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, can be reasonable considered anything but wishful thinking. And without the deity there are no miracles, in the theological sense.

Game over. Not ‘Game Won’ by atheists, but simply ‘Haven’t the foggiest’.

Of course theists introduce revelation and other nonsense. The problem then is, given the above, how would you distinguish a miracle from a natural unexplained event? You haven’t the foggiest. How do you distinguish a revelation in your head from a natural mental aberration? You haven’t the foggiest.

This lack of information places all this philosophy and theology into the realm of speculation on speculation, fantasy, wishful thinking. When philosophers engage in detailed consideration of what miracles might be they are playing theological games by theological rules, whereby if you can think it and it fits your pre-conceived theology then it is probably true, or at least debatable.

Might you add something?